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Abstract—This paper proposes a measurement approach for
estimating the privacy leakage from Intrusion Detection System
(IDS) alarms. Quantitative information flow analysis is used
to build a theoretical model of privacy leakage from IDS
rules, based on information entropy. This theoretical model is
subsequently verified empirically both based on simulations and
in an experimental study. The analysis shows that the metric
is able to distinguish between IDS rules that have no or low
expected privacy leakage and IDS rules with a significant risk
of leaking sensitive information, for example on user behaviour.
The analysis is based on measurements of number of IDS alarms,
data length and data entropy for relevant parts of IDS rules (for
example payload). This is a promising approach that opens up for
privacy benchmarking of Managed Security Service providers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this paper is to develop an entropy-based
metric that can be used for privacy leakage detection in
intrusion detection system (IDS) alarms. The approach should
be able to identify IDS rules that according to stakeholders’
perception have a significant potential for leaking private or
confidential information. It should also identify the worst IDS
rules from a privacy or confidentiality perspective based on
indicators that can be calculated automatically. For example
IDS rules that:
• have a significant risk to leak information that is sensitive
(privacy sensitive, security sensitive, business sensitive
etc.);
• have an unclear or too simple definition of the attack
detecting pattern, and therefore may trigger unnecessarily,
in the worst case on person sensitive or confidential
information.
Privacy policies can be used to define what information
that is sensitive. Examples of sensitive information may be
certain IP ranges of classified systems or sampled payload that
may reveal private or confidential information. Information can
also be defined as person sensitive by law, for example the
sampled payload from a health institution which may contain
person sensitive information. Another example is critical in-
frastructures that may contain security sensitive or confidential
information in the data traffic about the processes being
controlled. Last, but not least, payment databases handling
financial transactions may reveal sensitive information like
credit card numbers.
In these cases, the information is per definition sensitive,
which means that any leakage of information that can be
identified may be problematic. For such use cases, an objec-
tive information leakage metric will be sufficient to identify
problematic leakage of private or confidential information.
In other cases, the privacy sensitivity will be subjective,
and can only be evaluated in a representative way by the
owners of the data being sampled - the users themselves.
It may even in this case be possible for the data controller
to get realistic estimates of the perceived privacy sensitivity
by asking a representative random set of users, for example
using a random poll on the service being used, about how they
would value privacy leakages. However this approach will be
expensive and does not scale well. It is therefore only viable
for smaller evaluations of privacy impact.
It is therefore assumed possible for an authority like the
data controller, that is overseeing the privacy interests, to
estimate the privacy impact, denoted by I ≥ 0, that an
identified information leakage L ≥ 0 causes. The privacy
impact could for example be the subjective value or expected
liability from privacy or confidentiality breaches, as proposed
by [19]. The privacy leakage, denoted by piR for a given IDS
rule R can then be defined as the product of the information
leakage metric L and the privacy impact I , i.e: piR = I · L.
However, if investigation shows that the information leakage
is caused by activities from attack vectors that do not cause
any risk of revealing private, business sensitive or confidential
information, then the privacy impact for a given IDS rule
may be set low or even to zero. The combined metric piR
can be regarded as a privacy leakage risk metric, that can
be used to measure and perform incremental improvements of
the Managed Security Service (MSS) operation from a privacy
perspective.
Current IDSs typically provide an all or nothing solution for
handling private or confidential information in the alarms. The
payload of the alarms is either being sent in cleartext or may
be pseudonymised, for example by only sending references
to where more information can be found in a data forensics
system. There does not exist a more fine-grained management
nor any measurements of sensitive information flows in such
systems. It is in particular common that Open Source based
IDS’s like Snort, OSSEC or Prelude send payload in cleartext
in the IDS alarms. Having a metric for how privacy invasive
an MSS operation is will therefore be useful to benchmark
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2the performance of different MSS providers from a privacy
perspective. It will also be useful for tuning the IDS rulesets
and for implementing anonymisation policies to reduce the
privacy impact of the monitoring. Intuitively, such a privacy
leakage model relates to the perceived preciseness of the IDS
rule, i.e. how good it is at detecting only attack traffic without
revealing non-attack traffic.
A promising candidate for a privacy leakage metric for IDS
rules, is data entropy. This is a privacy leakage metric that
is based on the variability of the underlying data. Examples
of such metrics are Shannon-, Rnyi or Min-entropy, which
previously have been proposed as anonymity metrics [32, 5].
Entropy can also be used to measure coding efficiency, for
example whether sampled payload excerpts most likely are
encrypted or compressed [32]. This paper investigates a model
of privacy leakage from IDS rules that is based on the variation
in entropy between IDS alarms. This is to the best of our
knowledge the first comprehensive privacy leakage model for
IDS rules based on quantitative measurements of information
flow founded in information theory.
The proposed privacy leakage metric has several practical
applications. First, it can be used to identify imprecise IDS
rules, since such rules typically will have more variation in the
underlying data, and therefore also a larger variance in entropy
than more precise IDS rules. Furthermore, an advantage with
the proposed metric is that it can detect two common ways
of preserving privacy or data confidentiality: anonymisation
and pseudonymisation. Both encrypted and anonymised infor-
mation can be expected to have zero entropy variance, given
sufficiently long input. On the other hand, the entropy variance
of plaintext data will be significantly larger than for encrypted
data, as will be discussed in Section V-C.
This means that the entropy variance can be used as a
metric to detect leakage of private or confidential informa-
tion in message oriented data streams in general and IDS
alarms in particular. It can also be used to verify whether an
anonymisation/pseudonymisation or encryption scheme works
as intended.
This paper is organised as follows: Section II discusses
the motivation behind introducing an entropy variance based
information leakage metric, based on existing knowledge of
how common attack vectors work. Section III describes the
threat model and scenario that is assumed when using the
privacy leakage metric. Section IV develops the entropy-based
privacy leakage model based on quantitative information flow
analysis after introducing the necessary theoretical background
information. The last part discusses how clustering based
on the Expectation Maximisation algorithm can be used to
identify the underlying attack vectors for IDS rules that detect
more than one attack vector. Section V does a detailed analysis
of the convergence speed as a function of amount of input data
for the entropy algorithms and symbol definitions considered.
This includes analysing the metrics’ abilities to distinguish
between plaintext and encrypted data. Section VI analyses
experimental results based on realistic measurements of IDS
alarms. Section VIII discusses related works; Section IX
concludes the paper and Section X suggests future work and
research opportunities.
II. MOTIVATION
A precise IDS rule will in many cases report only one or
a few different attack patterns corresponding to real attack
vectors, as will be discussed below. One common type of
attack vector that follows this behaviour, is stack or heap
buffer overflow attacks [39]. These attack vectors frequently
use large sequences of characters corresponding to the NOP
operation or similar to increase the probability of successfully
exploiting buffer overflow vulnerabilities. The attacker does
then not need to know the exact memory location of injected
shellcode, since returning to any address within the NOP sled
will cause the shellcode to be executed. This makes it simpler
for the adversary to exploit such vulnerabilities. The entropy
of this NOP sled will be zero, and variance zero, as long as
only NOP operations are being used in the sled and the attack
vector does not mutate (e.g. by changing the length of the NOP
sled). This is clearly distinguishable from ordinary traffic, and
also easy to distinguish for rule-based IDSs.
Such naive attacks are however not so common nowadays,
because the IDS and anti-virus technologies easily can de-
tect such anomalies in the input. It is therefore increasingly
common that the adversaries obfuscate the attack vector.
Obfuscation of the NOP sled can for example be done using
metamorphic coding, which means that instructions in the sled
are substituted with other instructions that effectively perform
the same function [21]. Furthermore, it is now common prac-
tice that also the shellcode of the attack is being obfuscated by
using encryption techniques. This means that the attack after
the NOP sled contains a small decryption program, with a
decryption key that decrypts the obfuscated shellcode before it
is being run [37]. Even the decryption program can be hidden
by using metamorphic coding techniques [37], although this
is still not very common [28].
This means that obfuscated attack vectors can be expected
to have quite high entropy, in some cases indistinguishable
from encrypted traffic [37, 18]. This means that the variation
in entropy can be expected to go towards zero for a sufficiently
large data sample from a polymorphic attack vector, given that
it is indistinguishable from a perfect encryption scheme. Such
an attack vector will behave like random uniform data. This
means that the entropy variance of sufficiently large attack
vector samples from both traditional NOP sled based attacks
and modern obfuscated attacks also can be expected to have
low entropy variance.
It can furthermore be observed that samples of encrypted
user traffic, assuming that strong encryption is used, in itself
does not leak any private or confidential information, hence
can be expected to have low entropy variance. Ordinary non-
encrypted user traffic, can however be expected to show a
significant variance in entropy between different samples, as
illustrated in Figure V.2. This indicates that entropy variance
may be an interesting metric for measuring whether IDS
alarms leak information, in particular for buffer overflow type
of attacks. However this metric does obviously not understand
the semantics of the data traffic, and can therefore not be
used to evaluate whether the leaked information is private or
confidential.
3There also exist attack vectors that are indistinguishable
from plaintext data. Examples of such attacks are nonobfus-
cated Javascript Trojans or SQL injection attacks. This means
that the entropy standard deviation not necessarily can be
assumed to be close to the extreme points: encrypted data
(entropy close to 1) or NOP sleds (octet-entropy close to 0).
However, there are still some other useful characteristics of
such plaintext attacks in particular, and malware in general,
that can be exploited by such a metric:
• Attacks are to a great extent automated and performed
by large botnets of compromised hosts.
• Attack vectors do typically not yet mutate or change
dynamically1. This means that multiple attacks by a given
host being controlled by an adversary typically has the
same payload. Different hosts running the same version
of a given malware can also be expected to typically have
the same payload [28].
• Attack vectors are modular programs that are improved
incrementally, which means that not all parts of a mal-
ware will change at the same time, and some parts of
malware code are even shared between different malware
families [28].
• Botherders, that manage large botnets of compromised
hosts, will also have a self interest in a “well managed”
botnet. This means that the malware of a botnet at regular
intervals will be upgraded to include patches and new
functionalities, amongst others to avoid being detected
by Anti-Virus and IDS [17]. It is therefore reasonable to
believe that a large amount of the machines in a given
botnet will run the same version of the malware and
therefore also will use the same arsenal of attack vectors
for attacking other hosts.
This means that if an IDS rule is able to detect a given attack,
or attack variants, then there are several reasons to believe
that the entropy variance between instances of the same attack
vector may be small, even for nonobfuscated Javascript or SQL
injection attacks. This furthermore means that if the underlying
attack vectors detected by an IDS rule can be identified,
then the entropy variance (or entropy standard deviation)
around each attack vector can be considered a measure of
the precision of that rule hence also an indicator of possible
privacy leakages.
III. THREAT MODEL
The paper assumes that intrusion detection services have
been outsourced to a third party Managed Security Service
(MSS) provider. Security monitoring is furthermore subdivided
into two different security levels. An outsourced first-line ser-
vice that is doing 24x7 monitoring of the computer networks,
and a trusted second-line service that will have full knowledge
of the IDS service, including capabilities to perform data
forensic analysis. It is assumed that the MSS provider operates
using a privacy-enhanced IDS, so that changes to the IDS
ruleset must be agreed upon by both the data controller and
1Although proof-of-concept polymorphic self-mutating worms has been
demonstrated [22].
the second line security analyst responsible for updating the
IDS ruleset, to avoid that excessively privacy violating IDS
rules are being deployed.
It is therefore assumed that the IDS services run in a
controlled environment, where enforcement of a privacy pol-
icy supported by privacy leakage metrics makes sense. An
example of such an environment is critical infrastructures or
hospitals where security services have been outsourced to a
third party, and privacy metrics are required to ensure com-
pliance both to privacy and security policies. These policies
must ensure that the first-line security analysts, that are not
trusted to see sensitive information, do not get access to infor-
mation considered private or confidential by the owner of the
critical infrastructure. The objective is a stricter enforcement
of the need-to-know principle than what IDSs typically have
today. However, in order to enforce such privacy and security
policies, suitable privacy metrics are needed, which will be
developed here.
This paper mainly focuses on two adversaries: an external
adversary that may want to manipulate the privacy metrics for
example to reduce the chance of attacks being detected. The
IDS ruleset is assumed public, so that an external adversary
can investigate how the IDS rules work in order to perform
targeted attacks on either privacy or security. However the
external adversary will not know which IDS rules that are
enabled.
Insiders are divided into two main groups. First-line security
analysts are considered untrusted insiders, that only have
limited authorisation to see information and no authorisation to
modify information related to the IDS configuration. They do
not have access to the data forensic tool to investigate attacks
in detail. Second-line analysts are considered a trusted CERT
team, that has authorisation to perform security investigations
and reconfigure the IDS. A third actor is the data controller,
who shares the responsibility for managing the IDS ruleset
with the security officer, to ensure that both the privacy and
security objectives are being considered. The paper further-
more assumes that suitable enforcement mechanisms exist,
for example anonymisation or pseudonymisation schemes for
sensitive information in IDS alarms, so that the privacy leakage
metrics can be used for verification of the security or privacy
policies.
IV. A PRIVACY LEAKAGE MODEL OF IDS RULES
This section will first provide an information theoretic
analysis of privacy leakage from IDS alarms, assuming a
simple model of a perfect IDS rule RP that does not have any
false alarms. This model is subsequently generalised to handle
IDS rules that may leak potentially sensitive information, and
we then show how this model corresponds to measuring the
standard deviation of entropy from the IDS rule. It is finally
shown how to measure the privacy leakage from IDS rules
that detect more than one attack vector.
A. Basic Definitions
The definitions and notation in this section give a short
introduction to quantitative information flow analysis, and is
4based on [34]. It is throughout this paper assumed that the
logarithm is taken to the base 2, i.e. log(x) means log2(x).
Shannon and Min-entropy can be considered instances of the
more general Rnyi entropy [30], and we therefore use the
Rnyi notation to describe the entropies. Any Rnyi entropy
metric is denoted as Hα(X), where α is the entropy degree;
α = 1 represents Shannon entropy and α = ∞ represents
Min-entropy. Given an IDS rule R, which may leak sensitive
information from a set of input data X and to a set of
IDS alarms Y , the objective is then to measure how much
information R leaks.
Let X and Y be random variables whose set of possible
values are X and Y respectively. The Shannon entropy is then
defined by [32]:
H1(X) =
∑
x∈X
P [X = x]log
1
P [X = x]
(IV.1)
Shannon entropy indicates the number of bits that are
required to transfer X in an optimal way. The conditional
entropy denoted as H1(X|Y ) indicates the expected resulting
entropy from input data X given a set of IDS alarms Y that
pass through the IDS rule R [34]:
H1(X|Y ) =
∑
y∈Y
P [Y = y]H1(X|Y = y) (IV.2)
where
H1(X|Y = y) =
∑
x∈X
P [X = x|Y = y]log 1
P [X = x|Y = y]
(IV.3)
Min-entropy is another entropy metric that is calculated
based on the worst case (maximum) symbol occurrence prob-
ability, defined as the vulnerability V (X) that an adversary
can guess the value of X correctly in one try [34]:
V (X) = max
x∈X
P [X = x] (IV.4)
Min-entropy indicates the number of bits required to store
V (X), and is defined as [34]:
H∞(X) = log
1
V (X)
(IV.5)
The conditional min-entropy can be defined as [34]:
H∞(X|Y ) = log 1
V (X|Y ) (IV.6)
where
V (X|Y ) =
∑
y∈Y
P [Y = y]max
x∈X
P [X = x|Y = y] (IV.7)
It is then possible to define the information leakage LXY
from X to Y using either Shannon or Min-entropy as proposed
by [34]:
LXY = Hα(X)−Hα(X|Y ). (IV.8)
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Figure IV.1: IDS rule 1:2003 SQL Worm Propagation attempt,
behaving like RP .
B. Perfect model IDS Rule
Assume a perfect model IDS rule RP , that always detects
the attack vector and does not have any false alarms or other
entropy sources. Furthermore assume that the given attack
vector does not change between different attack instances. The
payload sample in the IDS alarm from RP is also assumed
to not contain any other entropy sources. The IDS will in this
case always sample the same payload excerpt in every alarm
according to the attack pattern definition.
This IDS rule is termed a perfect model IDS rule, since
it is considered perfect according to the theoretical model of
privacy leakage. RP is in other words a perfect model of IDS
rule behaviour from a privacy perspective. This is not a purely
theoretical IDS rule behaviour. We observed three IDS rules
that behaved like RP in our experiments, for example the Snort
IDS rule with SID 1:2003 SQL Worm Propagation attempt,
as shown in Figure IV.1. This is obviously a simplistic model
of an IDS rule, since it does not handle the fact that many
IDS rules and also non-rule based technologies like anomaly-
based IDS will be able to detect more than one attack vector,
and also variants of attack vectors. The model is furthermore
oblivious to whether the source of entropies is adversarial
or ordinary user activities. An entropy-based metric can only
measure whether information is leaking or not. Therefore the
privacy impact I will need to be evaluated, as discussed earlier.
The perfect model IDS rule will under these assumptions
provide a constant leakage denoted as c of information in each
alarm, corresponding to the pattern matched by RP .
The privacy impact I of this constant information leakage
as a privacy leakage is however not known. The privacy
impact of the information leakage from each IDS rule must
therefore be evaluated by a data controller, to determine
whether the expected information leakage from the IDS rule
can be considered necessary and acceptable from a security
perspective, and also that the effective privacy impact from
the rule can be considered negligible if the rule is effective
over time.
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Figure IV.2: Channel model of a perfect model IDS rule RP
that detects a single, nonchanging underlying attack.
This manual quality assurance procedure makes it possible
to detect and avoid IDS rules where I · c in itself is judged to
cause a significant privacy leakage, for example if the rule
itself triggers on person sensitive information. The privacy
leakage I ·c from each installed IDS rule is therefore in the rest
of this paper considered as either necessary or negligible. If
this constant privacy leakage is not considered tolerable, then
it is assumed that this can be mitigated using anonymisation
or pseudonymisation policies.
RP will under these assumptions always triggers on the
same attack pattern Y = {y}, as illustrated in Figure IV.2. The
inter-alarm entropy, assuming a set of input data X , denoted as
Hintα (X|Y ), is defined as the entropy between different IDS
alarms, calculated over the entire payload excerpt (i.e. each
IDS alarm is considered as one “symbol”). The inter-alarm
entropy will in this case be Hintα (X|Y ) = 0, since P [Y =
y] = 1. This means that a perfect model IDS rule according
to this definition from an information theoretical perspective
does not reveal any additional information apart from what can
be inferred from the limited and constant information leakage
c in each alarm.
This does not mean that additional leakage of sensitive
information cannot occur, since the resulting privacy leakage
also will depend on the timing and context of the alarms. Addi-
tional information may for example be revealed by correlating
the interdependencies between the IDS rules.
However, under the given assumptions, this means that when
RP triggers, then a known data pattern will have been sent in
the input data stream. This information leakage is considered a
tolerable privacy leakage under the assumptions in the previous
subsection.
C. A Non-perfect IDS rule R
Then consider a non-perfect IDS rule R, which in addition
to the assumed necessary and limited information leakage
by the attack pattern, also may have false alarms or other
entropy sources, as illustrated in Figure IV.3. However, it
still only detects one attack vector, that does not change
between attacks. This means that the entropy distribution
function will be unimodal, perhaps with some outliers as
illustrated in Figure IV.3. This is a simplistic model of how
an IDS rule behaves. It does not assume any particular IDS
rule implementation (e.g. whether string matching or regular
expressions are being used) and does not take any position on
the type of IDS technology being used. Experimental results
have however shown that a significant amount of all IDS rules
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Figure IV.3: IDS rule 1:2925 1x1 GIF attempt (web bug),
illustrating a privacy leaking IDS rule.
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Figure IV.4: Channel model of a non-perfect IDS rule R that
detects a single nonmutating underlying attack vector. R may
have false alarms or other entropy sources, which means that
Hintα (X|Y ) > 0.
(35-53% in the experiments we have performed2) actually
behave in this way. However, this also means that many IDS
rules actually do not behave this way. We will therefore later
discuss how this restriction can be removed.
The model of a unimodal non-perfect IDS rule is illustrated
in Figure IV.4. Assume that this IDS rule generates the ordered
set of N IDS alarms denoted as Y = {y1, y2, ..., yN}, where
P [Y = yi] < P [Y = yj ] for i < j, i, j ∈ 1, 2, ..., N . The
inter-alarm entropy will in this case be greater than zero for
both Shannon and Min-entropy, because
n∑
i=1
P [X|Y = yi] = 1
and P [X|Y = y1] < 1.
D. Privacy Leakage Model
The next question is how to model the privacy leakage from
the non-perfect IDS rule R. One way to do this, is to measure
the information leakage of the non-perfect IDS rule R relative
to a perfect model IDS rule RP , as illustrated in Figure IV.5.
The communication channel then consists of a cascade of two
IDS rules (or two IDS rules connected in series), where the
output of the first IDS rule serves as input to the second IDS
253% of the IDS rules in the experiments performed here were unimodal,
indicating one attack vector. A former pre-experiment at a commercial MSS
provider indicated that 35% of the IDS rules were unimodal.
6RPR Hα (Y∣Z )=c
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LYZ
Figure IV.5: Channel model of privacy leakage from a non-
perfect IDS rule R, measured relative to a perfect model IDS
rule.
rule. Both IDS rules have the objective to trigger on the same
attack vector, however the first IDS rule R is non-perfect, and
may have false alarms or other entropy sources, whereas the
second IDS rule RP is considered a perfect model IDS rule.
The advantage of using a cascading model, is that this allows
for comparing known values, and it is not dependent on the
unknown Internet traffic X . The set of alarms Y from R are
known by the MSS provider and the set of expected alarms Z
from RP are also known given Y .
Focusing on the inter-alarm entropies is not a fruit-
ful approach here, since the difference in inter-alarm en-
tropies is Hintα (X|Y ) − Hintα (Y |Z) = Hintα (X|Y ), because
Hintα (Y |Z) = 0. What is needed, is therefore a measure of
the limited information leakage that the perfect model IDS
rule causes.
This initial information loss, denoted as the intra-alarm
information loss Hα(X), can be expressed by measuring the
entropy of the IDS alarm in bits, instead of measuring the inter-
alarm entropy Hintα (the entropy between IDS alarms, consid-
ering the entire IDS alarm as one symbol). The intra-alarm
entropy for a perfect model IDS rule RP can be calculated by
assuming that the IDS alarm consists of a large sequence of
bits. This can be expressed formally by considering a given
IDS alarm as y ∈ {0, 1} where P [y = 1] = 1− P [y = 0].
Considering the perfect model IDS rule first, then this IDS
rule will always return the same IDS alarm Z = {y} where
y ∈ {0, 1} with bit-probability {P [y = 0], P [y = 1]}. The
information leakage is defined according to (IV.8) as:
LY Z = Hα(X|Y = y)−Hα(Y = y|Z = y) = Hα(X|Y = y)
(IV.9)
Since RP is deterministic, then Z will be determined by Y ,
which means that Hα(Y |Z) = 0. Furthermore, for Shannon
entropy:
H1(X|Y = y) =
∑
x∈{0,1}
P [X = x|Y = y]log 1
P [X = x|Y = y]
(IV.10)
P [X = x|Y = y] = 0 for x 6= y, which means that this can
be expressed as:
H1(X = y) =
∑
y∈{0,1}
P [X = y]log
1
P [X = y]
(IV.11)
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Figure IV.6: Shannon vs. Min-entropy.
which gives:
H1(X = y) = P [y = 0]log
1
P [y = 0]
+ (IV.12)
(1− P [y = 0])log 1
(1− P [y = 0]) = c1 (IV.13)
This shows that RP has a constant privacy leakage LY Z =
c1 for Shannon entropy. This can also be shown for Min-
entropy by substituting into Equation (IV.6):
H∞(X|Y = y) = log 1
V (X|Y = y) (IV.14)
where the vulnerability V (X|Y = y) can be expressed as:
V (X|Y = y) =
∑
y∈{0,1}
P [Y = y] max
x∈{0,1}
P [X = x|Y = y]
(IV.15)
P [X = x|Y = y] = 0 for x 6= y, which means that this can
be expressed as:
V (X|Y = y) = P [y = 0]2 + P [y = 1]2 (IV.16)
which can be expressed as
V (X|Y = y) = 1− 2P [y = 0](1− P [y = 0]) (IV.17)
This shows that the vulnerability is V (X|Y = y) = 1 for
P [y = 0] ∈ {0, 1}. The lowest vulnerability is V (X|Y =
y) = 12 for P [y = 0] =
1
2 , as expected. This means that the
Min-entropy for RP can be expressed as:
H∞(X|Y = y) = log 1
1− 2P [y = 0](1− P [y = 0]) = c∞
(IV.18)
This means that RP has a constant information leakage for
both Shannon-entropy LY Z = c1 and Min-entropy LY Z =
c∞. However these constants are different, except in the
7special cases where P [y = 0] ∈ {0, 12 , 1}, as can be expected
(see Figure IV.6).
Let the constant information leakage for either Shannon
or Min-entropy be denoted as cα. The relative information
leakage from the IDS rule R can then be formally defined as
follows:
Definition 1. Let R be a non-perfect IDS rule, that in addition
to the assumed necessary and limited information leakage by
the attack pattern, also may have false alarms or other entropy
sources. Let RP be a perfect model IDS rule with a limited
privacy leakage cα, α ∈ {1,∞}3. The relative information
leakage LY Z for an IDS rule R with input X , that generates a
set of IDS alarms Y = {y1, y2, ..., yN}, each with probability
P [Y = yi], i = 1, ..., N is then defined as the difference in
intra-alarm entropy between R and a perfect model IDS rule
RP that both trigger on the same attack vector:
LY Z = Hα(X|Y )− cα (IV.19)
If the probability distribution function (PDF) of the IDS
alarm entropies for a given attack vector is symmetric, then
the average entropy denoted as Hα(X|Y ) for input X and a
sufficiently large set of IDS alarms Y can be considered as
a good estimator of cα. For skewed distributions, the median
may give a better estimate, given that the sample is sufficiently
large. It can furthermore be observed that the precision of this
estimator will improve with the precision of the IDS rule R.
This means that the information leakage of R for a given IDS
alarm yi can be expressed as:
LY Z = Hα(X|Y = yi)−Hα(X|Y ) (IV.20)
where the average entropy can be expressed as
Hα(X|Y ) =
N∑
i=1
P [Y = yi]Hα(yi) (IV.21)
for a set of input data X .
E. Information Leakage for a Sample of IDS Alarms
The average entropy per byte for a sample y1, y2, ..., yN of
N IDS alarms generated by an IDS rule R that detects a single
attack vector, can be expressed as
Hα =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Hα(yi). (IV.22)
The information leakage for any IDS alarm yj , denoted as
LR(yj) can then be expressed as:
LR(yj) = Hα(yj)− 1
N
N∑
i=1
Hα(yi) (IV.23)
3It is possible to show that this definition generalises to any Rnyi entropy,
however that is beyond the scope of this paper , since Min-entropy and
Shannon-entropy are considered the best candidates for the privacy leakage
metric [34].
Further processing of the information leakage LR(yi) for
the IDS alarms y1, y2, ..., yn can now be calculated using tra-
ditional statistical analysis. The privacy leakage of the IDS rule
can be expressed as the standard deviation σα, error margin
2σα or the 95% confidence interval ±2σα of the IDS rule.
This gives an indication of the expected precision of the IDS
rule. Another useful metric, is to consider the worst-case in-
formation leakage denoted as LmaxR where L
max
R =
n
max
i=1
LR,
or the minimum information leakage denoted as LminR where
LminR =
n
min
i=1
LR. Both of these can be useful in statistical
analyses, in addition to the standard deviation. Furthermore,
the privacy leakage can be calculated as piLR = LR · IR, where
IR is the privacy impact estimated by the data controller.
F. Sample Standard Deviation of Entropy σα
1) Normal Distribution: Assuming that the probability
distribution of alarms can be approximated using a Normal
distribution, then the standard deviation can be calculated
using the second norm.
Assume that the IDS generates a sample of n IDS alarms
(y1, y2, ..., yN ). Each alarm yi contains payload or other
potentially privacy leaking elements or attributes from the
IDS alarms generated by an IDS rule R. The sample standard
deviation of the entropy of the elements can then be expressed
as:
σα =
√√√√ 1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
(LR)2 =
√√√√ 1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
(Hα(yi)−Hα)2
(IV.24)
The general properties of the variance of entropy measure-
ments σ2α will fulfill the same requirements as the standard
deviation of entropy measurements. However, the standard
deviation is considered more appropriate, since it operates with
the same unit of measure as the entropy.
2) Laplacian Distribution: An alternative distribution that
during the experiment was shown to fit the data well, is the
Laplacian (or double exponential) distribution. The Laplacian
standard deviation, denoted as σLα is based the L
1 norm (or
Manhattan distance), and can be expressed as the sum of
absolute deviations:
σLα =
√
2
N
N∑
i=1
∣∣Hα(yi)−Hα∣∣ (IV.25)
A well known advantage with σLα , is that it will be less
influenced by outliers in the tail of the PDFs than the standard
deviation of the Normal distribution.
The standard deviation of normalised entropy is a measure
of the relative information leakage from an IDS rule, under the
assumption that it detects only one nonmutating attack vector.
If an IDS rule detects the attack vector perfectly without any
false alarms, then the entropy of the IDS alarms will always
be the same, and σα = 0. If the IDS alarm is precise at
detecting the attack, then only a few bits of information will
vary between IDS alarms. This means that all alarms will have
similar entropy with low standard deviation and therefore also
8low information leakage. However if the IDS rule also has
a significant amount of false alarms, or gets entropy from
other sources then the entropy variance, and therefore also
the information leakage from the IDS rule, will increase.
G. Aggregating σα
This subsection shows how the standard deviation of entropy
metric can be aggregated for a set of IDS rules. Assume
that an IDS uses a rule set denoted as Rall with m IDS
rules Rall = {R1, R2, ..., Rm}. Each IDS rule Ri matches
independently a set of Ni IDS alarms:
Yi = {yi,1, yi,2, ..., yi,Ni}, i = 1, 2, ...,m where the number
of IDS alarms Ni typically will vary between IDS rules.
Furthermore, assume that the IDS alarms are independent and
non-overlapping, i.e. Yi∩Yj = ∅ for i 6= j. This means that all
IDS alarms, denoted Yall, can be expressed as Yall =
m⋃
i=1
Yi.
Assume that an IDS rule Ri has entropy standard deviation
denoted as σi and resulting standard deviation denoted as σall.
The aggregated metric should furthermore fulfill the following
criteria in order to provide meaningful aggregation:
C1 If all IDS rules have the same standard deviation,
say σi, then σall should also be the same, i.e.
σall = σi.
C2 The resulting entropy standard deviation should
be weighted according to how many alarms that
trigger on a given IDS rule Ri.
Each IDS rule should be assessed individually, in the same
way as each underlying vulnerability should be assessed
individually. This means that a weighted average, weighted
by number of alarms from each IDS rule, can be used as
aggregation function for σall, i.e:
σall =
m∑
i=1
Niσi
m∑
i=1
Ni
(IV.26)
This function fulfills criterion C1, since the resulting aver-
age weighted sum is the same if σi is the same for all IDS
rules Ri and it fulfills C2 by weighting the standard deviation
against number of IDS alarms.
H. IDS Rules Detecting Several Attack Vectors
A significant part of the IDS rules will detect more than
one attack vector, as illustrated in Figure VI.1. The data
set used in this paper has 47% of the IDS rules with more
than one attack vector. An earlier preliminary experiment at
a commercial MSS provider shows even higher percentage
(65%). An indication of an IDS rule that detects several attack
vectors, is that the entropy probability distribution is multi-
modal. Figure IV.7 shows an example IDS rule that matches
three privacy leaking attack vectors. The Figure shows the
payload entropy distribution of the Snort IDS rule with SID
1:11969 VOIP-SIP inbound 401 Unauthorized. A payload
length correction causes the metric to be larger than one, and is
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Figure IV.7: Payload length corrected Shannon octet-entropy
distribution of IDS rule (Snort SID 1:11969) matching three
attack vectors.
required to make the metric incentive compatible4. The details
of this can be ignored for now, since this will be discussed
in Section V-D. Each attack vector cluster corresponds to a
different SIP service provider.
A clustering algorithm is needed to identify each underlying
attack vector for multi-modal distributions. Each individual
cluster will in this case represent an attack vector, which
behaves in a similar way as a non-perfect IDS rule described
in Section IV-C. This means that the privacy leakage of each
attack vector cluster can be calculated as the entropy standard
deviation over all samples belonging to the cluster, and the
resulting privacy leakage for the IDS rule can be calculated
by aggregating the data over all IDS rules in the cluster using
Equation IV.26.
I. How to Perform the Clustering
There are two main types of clustering algorithms: hard
clustering and soft clustering. Hard clustering algorithms
assign each sample to a given cluster. Examples of a hard
clustering algorithm is the popular k-means and k-medians
algorithms [25, 4]. Hard clustering is however not appropriate
for clustering the IDS rules, since it cuts off the samples at the
tail of the distribution where two distributions overlap. This
will give a bias towards lower entropy standard deviation than
can be expected.
Soft clustering is then a better approach, since it assigns the
probability that each sample belongs to a given cluster, instead
of assigning each sample to a given cluster. A commonly
used soft clustering technique is the Expectation Maximisation
(EM) algorithm [8]. This soft-clustering method provides a
Maximum Likelihood estimate of the underlying data distri-
bution as a mixture of assumed probability distributions. The
EM-algorithm is basically a two-step hill-climbing technique
where the first step (E-step) calculates the expectation of the
4Incentive compatibility – a characteristic of mechanisms whereby each
agent knows that his best strategy is to follow the rules, no matter what the
other agents will do [23].
9log-likelihood using the current estimate of the parameters of
the underlying probability distributions. The second step (M-
step) computes the parameters that maximise the expected log-
likelihood identified during the E-step.
There are however some drawbacks with the EM-algorithm.
It is prone to get stuck in local minima, which means that
it is sensitive to the initial cluster parameters. We use the
cluster centers identified by k-means, since this is a gener-
ally recommended method of initialising the cluster centers5.
Another issue is the selection of number of clusters. Too many
clusters may cause EM to overfit the data, whereas too few
clusters may give a poor representation of the distribution of
the samples.
It is commonly assumed that the underlying probability
distribution either is a mixture of Gaussian or Laplacian
probability density functions. Both outliers and skewedness
have been found to be significant during the experimental
analysis in Section VI. We have therefore decided to model the
probability distribution as a mixture of Laplacian probability
density functions using the method proposed in [6]. This
method is based on order statistics (uses a weighted median
instead of the mean), and is therefore more robust against
outliers and skewedness than using a Gaussian mixture [6].
The remainder of this section highlights the necessary theory
and notation to understand how we have implemented the
Laplacian mixture based clustering.
J. Laplacian Mixture Model
This section defines the general notation, which is based on
the well-known theory of learning finite mixture models [2,
13]. Furthermore, the Laplacian Mixture Model used here,
is based on [6]. Our implementation is simplified compared
to the original solution, since only univariate clustering is
needed. Let HR be a random variable representing the IDS
alarm entropies of an IDS rule R, with Hα representing one
particular outcome of HR. This random variable is expressed
as:
P [HR = Hα|Θ] =
K∑
k=1
βkP [HR = Hα|Θ = θk] (IV.27)
where β1, ..., βK are the mixing probabilities, each θk is
the set of parameters defining the k-th component of the
mixture and Θ = {θ1, ..., θK , β1, ..., βK} is the complete set
of parameters that define the mixture. Being probabilities, βk
must satisfy βk ≥ 0 and
K∑
k=1
βk = 1. It is assumed that all
the components of the mixture are Laplacian distributions
P [HR = Hα|θk] = L (Hα|θk = (µ˜, λ)). The Laplacian
distribution is defined as:
L (Hα|µ˜k, λk) = 1
2λk
exp
(
−|Hα − µ˜k|
λk
)
(IV.28)
5We used k-means from the Python module scikit-learn to initialise the EM
algorithm [27].
where Hα(yi) is the entropy of the IDS alarm yi, λk > 0 is
the scale parameter and µ˜k is the median for mixture compo-
nent θk. In the remainder, assume the shorthand notation that
Lα,i,k = L (Hα(yi)|θk).
K. EM-Algorithm for Laplacian Mixture Model
The implementation of the EM-algorithm is based on
[6, 13]. Assume that the EM-algorithm is performing cluster
analysis on a sample of N ordered entropy values Hα =
(Hα,(y1), Hα(y2), ...,Hα(yN )), where Hα(yi) < Hα(yj) for
i < j, i, j ∈ 1, 2, ..., N . These entropy values are calculated
over the IDS alarms y1, y2, ..., yN generated by an IDS rule
R. The Expectation Maximisation algorithm for the Laplacian
Mixture Model then consists of two steps that are iterated until
convergence is detected:
E-step: calculate the conditional expectation of the complete
log-likelihood wi,k = log(P [HR = Hα(yi)|Θ = θk]) that
Hα(yi) comes from the k-th component of the mixture:
wi,k =
βkLα,i,k∑K
k=1 βkLα,i,k
(IV.29)
M-step: estimate new model parameters θk = (µ˜k, λk) and
weights βk that maximise the log-likelihood log(Lα,i,k) of
the model:
µ˜k = wmedian(Hα, k) (IV.30)
λk =
1∑N
i=1 wi,k
N∑
i=1
wi,k |Hα(yi)− µ˜k| (IV.31)
βk =
N∑
i=1
wi,k
N∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
wi,k
(IV.32)
where the algorithm to calculate the weighted median for a
given cluster k, according to [6], is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Weighted median.
1: function WMEDIAN(Hα, k)
2: Q = (q0 = 0, q1 = 0, ..., qN = 0)
3: sum=0
4: for i← 1, ..., N do
5: sum← sum+ wi,k
6: qi = sum
7: end for
8: for i← 1, ..., N do
9: if qi > 12qN > qi−1 then
10: return (Hα(yi) +Hα(yi−1))/2
11: else if qi = 12qN then
12: return Hα(yi)
13: end if
14: end for
15: end function
The algorithm uses the Minimum Message Length (MML)
as stop criterion [40], assuming one-dimensional data. We do
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not go into details on the MML criterion and just present
the implemented solution here. The detailed derivation of the
MML criterion used can be found in [13].
MML =
K∑
k=0
log(
Nβk
12
) +
K
2
log
N
12
+
3K
2
−
maxk
{
N∑
i=1
log(wi,k)
}
(IV.33)
The last term of Equation IV.33 is derived from the fact that
the minimum of the MML criterion over Θ can be obtained
by using the negative maximum of the log-likelihood (the last
term), since
maxΘ {log (P [HR|Θ])} = maxk
{
N∑
i=1
log(wi,k)
}
.
(IV.34)
The algorithm stops when the difference in MML length
between two iterations is less than MML = 1 × 10−4. In
addition to the MML criterion, the implementation of the EM
algorithm requires at least 40 iterations to converge initially,
and at least 20 iterations to converge after modifications of the
cluster definitions. This is to avoid accidentally hitting a local
MML minimum before convergence has occurred.
L. Determining the Optimal Number of Clusters k
We initially tested the method for estimating the number of
components in [13]. This method worked for nice continuous
distributions, however it did not work equally well for for
noisy or a mixture containing binomial distributions, since the
EM-algorithm then easily got stuck in local modes. Overfitting
was also a significant problem for binomial distributions.
Furthermore, to judge whether a cluster should be inter-
preted as an attack vector or not typically requires that the
data controller does some investigation of the IDS alarms. This
means that some degree of manual intervention typically will
be required during the clustering to assert obvious clusters that
the clustering algorithm has missed or delete clusters where
overfitting occurs. A typical example of overfitting is where
several components with the same median are used to represent
a given cluster. Another example is for skewed distributions,
where the EM attempts to fit the skewed curve by overfitting
the data.
We implemented a simple user interface for managing the
clusters. It supports configuration of the initial number of
clusters k as well as managing the model definition Θ after
the initial configuration. The program also supports selecting
type of entropy data and IDS rule to analyse from the datasets.
The user interface for managing the clustering consists of the
following functions:
setcl(k,µ˜k) Assert that the cluster number k has a mode at
µ˜k.
delcl(clusterlist) Delete clusters at index clusterlist. Deleted
clusters are marked with θk = (µk = 0, ρk =
0, β = 0).
pickcl() Pick the cluster to be asserted by clicking the
mouse at the position to be asserted in the his-
togram showing the frequency distribution of the
IDS alarm entropies. If there are no clusters that
are marked as deleted, then the least significant
cluster (with lowest βk) will be chosen.
After having modified the clusters, the EM-algorithm contin-
ues by typing the cont command in the debugger. When the
data controller is satisfied with the cluster definition, typing
cont without modifying the cluster causes the algorithm to
finish and print out the calculated privacy leakage for each
cluster and also the aggregated privacy leakage for the IDS
rule R.
M. Calculating the Privacy Leakage for Clusters
The privacy leakage for the identified clusters is calculated
after the data controller has asserted that the relevant clusters
have been identified and that the EM-algorithm subsequently
has converged. All probability mass is then assigned to the
clusters, which means that the privacy leakage can be calcu-
lated for the given IDS rule R.
First, the model Θ will in itself give an indication of the
privacy leakage in the form of the entropy standard deviation
of the Laplacian function L (Hα(yi)|θk) for a given cluster k.
It is a well known fact that this can be calculated from the scale
parameter λk for a Laplacian distribution as σLk =
√
2λk.
However to be able to aggregate the entropy standard deviation
over all clusters, the relative proportion of the samples for a
given cluster θk must be estimated, which is exactly what
βk indicates. This means that the resulting entropy standard
deviation for the IDS rule R can be calculated as the weighted
average using Equation IV.26, substituting Ni with βk:
σLR =
K∑
k=1
βkσ
L
k . (IV.35)
A disadvantage by using σLk , is that this only will be
correct if the model fits the data reasonably well. This may
be true in some cases, however the sample distributions in the
experiments do in several cases deviate significantly from the
model due to outliers, heavy tails or noise. In these cases, it
will be more correct to have a measure of σα that is based
on the underlying samples Hα(yi) weighted according to the
conditional expectation wi,k of the model distributions defined
by Θ, so that the weighted entropy is described by wi,kHα(yi).
This means that the model distributions is used to specify
how the samples are divided between the clusters, instead of
defining the clusters directly. The mean value of the cluster
entropies for cluster k can then be expressed as:
µk =
N∑
i=1
wi,kHα(yi)
N∑
i=1
wi,k
(IV.36)
and the Normal standard deviation can be expressed in a
similar way as:
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σk =
√√√√√√√√√√
N∑
i=1
wi,k (Hα(yi)− µk)2
N∑
i=1
wi,k
. (IV.37)
Furthermore, the Laplacian standard deviation, based on
the L1 norm, can be expressed in terms of the conditional
expectation wi,k and the median of the mixture component
µ˜k as:
σLk =
√
2
N∑
i=1
wi,k |Hα(yi)− µ˜k|
N∑
i=1
wi,k
. (IV.38)
The resulting aggregated entropy standard deviation for
the IDS rule R can in both these cases be calculated from
Equation IV.35 by substituting the relevant standard deviation
into the equation. The clustering analysis tool prints out both
the individual standard deviations per cluster as well as the
resulting standard deviation for the IDS rule based on both
the standard deviation of the model σLR , Normal standard
deviation σk and Laplacian standard deviation σLk . It is useful
to compare these, since a large deviation between σLR and
the other standard deviations indicate a poor model fit, which
may or may not be relevant depending on examination of the
underlying data.
One can for example expect good model fit for IDS rules
with some Gaussian or Laplacian noise, since this is close to
the expected model of privacy leakage. However very noisy
rules that match random traffic will get a poor model fit. An
example of this is the IDS rule 1:1394000 in our experiments
that detects random traffic. It has a standard deviation over all
data of 6.7 for both Normal and Laplacian standard deviation,
but only a model standard deviation of σL1:1394000=1,44 . In
such cases the standard deviation of the model σLR will not
be usable. Another example is if σk is significantly larger
than σLk , then σk may be unduly influenced by outliers, which
means that σLk would be the more robust estimate. In general,
the Laplacian standard deviation can be expected to give
the most conservative estimate, which is least influenced by
skewedness and outliers.
N. Summary of EM-based Clustering
The Laplacian Mixture Model is implemented using the
EM-algorithm. A semiautomatic process is used to identify the
underlying clusters in the IDS alarms. The standard deviation
of entropy metric is then calculated for each cluster and also
the aggregated metric for the entire IDS rule. A possible attack
on the clustering method, is an overfitting attack where a MSS
provider decides to shirk by deliberately overfitting the attack
vectors, by asserting too many clusters during the clustering
process. It is therefore important that the role as data controller
is separate from the role as security manager, and also that
external quality assurance entities like certification organisa-
tions oversee the operation, to ensure that it is not overly
privacy invasive. It must be emphasised that the objective not
necessarily is to match the underlying probability distribution
as closely as possible. The objective is rather to identify any
likely attack vectors, and distribute the samples between these.
The EM algorithm does this reasonably well.
The EM-based clustering generalises the privacy leakage
metric to work for IDS rules that detect more than one attack
vector. This generalisation is necessary, since our experiments
have shown that a significant amount of all IDS rules trigger on
more than one underlying attack vector. An advantage with this
generalisation, is that it avoids the incentive incompatibility of
the single cluster metric, which would encourage a shirking
MSS provider to cheat by splitting up IDS rules into smaller
IDS rules detecting a single attack vector.
V. DETAILED ANALYSIS OF σα
This section does a more thorough investigation of the
standard deviation of entropy metric σα. The objective of
this discussion is to do an analysis of the convergence speed
required to reliably detect random uniform input data as a
function of the data length. It is expected that random uniform
input data converges towards zero entropy standard deviation
for a sufficiently long data series. This convergence speed is an
important decision factor for the selection of entropy algorithm
and symbol definition, since the IDS alarm entropies are calcu-
lated over a limited number of IDS alarms. Furthermore, it is
discussed which metric and symbol definition that works best
for distinguishing between plaintext and encrypted data. This
analysis shows which entropy type (Min- or Shannon entropy)
and symbol size (bit or octet) that is best for calculating
privacy leakage in IDS rules.
A. Entropy Calculation
There are at least three obvious ways of selecting the symbol
space that is used to calculate the entropies:
1) Define the payload of the IDS alarm as the symbol, i.e.
calculate the inter-alarm entropy;
2) Use binary entropy, i.e. the intra-alarm entropy as
described in Section V-A;
3) Use octets, i.e. 8-bit words, which commonly are used
to define the character set in computer systems.
Other word sizes are possible, however these are considered
the most common and interesting ones for our purpose.
Each of these symbol definitions have their advantages and
disadvantages, and it is important to note that the entropy
values calculated from each of these definitions typically will
be different. It has already been shown that the intra-alarm
entropy calculated from bit-entropy is different from the inter-
alarm entropy by a constant value. Furthermore, the inter-
alarm entropy is not possible to use, since it can not be used
to calculate the standard deviation of entropy.
Bit-entropy was used to develop the Equation IV.20, since it
is the easiest way to develop the theory for the privacy leakage
metric. The entropy standard deviation formula is however not
dependent on any particular symbol definition, as long as the
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symbol definition ensures that the entropy standard deviation
in the worst case, i.e. for random, uniform data, can be
measured to be sufficiently close to zero for encrypted traffic.
It is assumed that σα converges towards zero for random,
uniform data as a function of input data length, however the
convergence speed is unknown and must be investigated. It can
furthermore be observed that for a perfect encryption scheme
that is approximated by random uniform data, the symbol
definition does not matter, since random uniform data does
not leak any information. This means that if the objective is
to purely detect whether the information conveyed is encrypted
or not, then the entropy scheme with fastest convergence speed
may make sense to use.
This means that the minimum length of data required to
reliably detect that random uniform data has zero variance
(i.e. speed of convergence) is an important design factor that
this metric relies on. It can be expected that different entropy
metrics will have different convergence speed. In particular,
can Min-entropy be expected to converge more slowly, since
it only considers the maximum symbol occurrence probability,
and not a weighted sum of all symbol occurrence probabilities,
as Shannon entropy does.
B. Entropy Bias of Finite Length Encrypted Data
A question that needs to be investigated, is therefore how
different entropy standard deviation metrics σα (Shannon-
or Min-entropy) respond to random uniform data strings of
varying length, and also how it is influenced by the symbol
width, i.e. whether bit-entropy or octet-based entropy is used.
The reason for this, as discussed in Subsection IV-F2, is that
the metric shall be able to measure privacy leakage sufficiently
close to zero in the following three cases:
1) For a perfect model IDS rule RP which detects and dis-
plays one or more non-changing attack vectors perfectly;
2) for anonymised IDS alarms from the IDS rule;
3) as a limit case for encrypted (e.g. pseudonymised) IDS
alarms from the IDS rule, as the number of bits n in the
IDS alarm goes towards infinity.
The entropy standard deviation bias for finite length en-
crypted data, denoted as σbiasα , can be analysed by simulating
the response function of σbiasα as a function of number of
bits of data. The simulation is based on a set of Monte-
Carlo experiments, one for each octet of data. Each standard
deviation is the average of an ensemble of 10000 experiments.
Bit-length is calculated for each octet as eight times the octet
length, in order to have comparable x-axis values for bit- and
octet-based data. The experiments are based on simulations
using random uniform data selection, which means that a
Normal distribution can be assumed.
Figure V.1 shows a log-log plot of the entropy standard
deviations. The bit-entropies both appear to be log-linear,
which means that the bias for detecting a perfectly en-
crypted IDS alarm with length n bits can be expressed as
log2(σ
bias
α ) = log2(γα+ψαn), where γα is the offset and ψα
is the slope of the log-log scale. This gives σbiasα = 2
γαnψα ,
where 2γα is constant. The slope can be calculated from the
experimental data, which shows that that ψ1 = −1.005 ≈ −1
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Figure V.1: Log-log plot of entropy standard deviation as a
function of number of bits input data for Min and Shannon
entropy and bit and octet symbol definition.
for Shannon bit-entropy and ψ∞ = −0.479 ≈ − 12 for Min-
entropy. This means that σbias1 ≈ 2
γ
1
n , whereas σ
bias
∞ ≈ 2
γ∞√
n
,
which means that Shannon bit-entropy converges by an order
of O(n−
1
2 ) faster towards zero than Min-entropy6. Shannon
bit-entropy has initially 2.7 times less bias than Min-entropy
for perfectly encrypted (i.e. random uniform) data.
The octet-based entropies perform very poorly during the
initial transient phase, but are then stabilised on a slope
similar to the respective bit-entropy slopes, as shown in Figure
V.1. This means that there is a significant, but approximately
constant, difference between the bit- and octet-based metrics
after the initial transient phase. Shannon bit-entropy entropy
ends up with a precision 143 times better than Shannon octet-
entropy after 80 kbit. The difference in precision between bit-
and octet-based Min-entropy is smaller, only 25 times.
A nice property is that the bias is systematic, which means
that the entropy standard deviation calculations may be able
to compensate for it by subtracting the expected bias from the
entropy standard deviation, given that the number of samples
(IDS alarms) is sufficiently large. However, this only makes
sense if it is known that the data are encrypted. Since this in
general is not known for the payload from IDS rules, and it
will be wrong to correct for this bias for nonencrypted data,
this means that the metric with fastest convergence speed is
preferable.
It must also be noted that bit-based entropies (both Shannon
Min-entropy) are computationally less complex than octet-
based Shannon entropy, which needs to calculate the weighted
logarithm expression for each symbol in an octet. Counting
the number of bits set to one in an octet or word (list of
octets) can be done by calculating the Hamming weight,
which is implemented in hardware on most modern Intel or
AMD processors using the popcnt (population count) operator.
6This means that each factor in the bit-entropy calculations (one for Min-
entropy and two for Shannon entropy) contributes with a convergence speed
of O(n−
1
2 ).
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Figure V.2: Difference and 95% confidence band between σα
for plaintext and random data using bit-entropy for varying
input data length in bits.
This opens up for efficient implementations of bit-entropy
calculations for up to 64 bits word chunks [7], which is more
efficient than iterating to calculate the octet frequencies, as
required by octet-based entropies.
C. Entropy Standard Deviation Difference between Encrypted
and Plaintext data
Another foundational scenario that must be investigated, is
how well the proposed entropy algorithms and symbol defini-
tions distinguish between encrypted and plaintext information.
The entire theory behind σα hinges on the assumption that
there is a difference in entropy standard deviation between
plaintext and as a limit case encrypted information. To deter-
mine whether this assumption is true or not, and which entropy
configuration that works best, we set up another Monte-Carlo
simulation, this time comparing the entropy standard deviation
of plaintext data with the entropy standard deviation of random
uniform data for both Min- and Shannon-entropy, using both
bit and octet-based symbol definition.
The experiment configuration calculates the average and the
95% confidence band (±2σ) from an ensemble of 10000 ex-
periments. Each experiment calculates the standard deviation
over 50 samples for varying input data length in bits, assuming
that this is the smallest number of samples that in practice
will be used to reliably distinguish between encrypted and
plaintext data. If less samples are used per experiment, then the
confidence band will widen out, meaning that longer payload
will be needed to reliably distinguish between encrypted and
plaintext data. There is in other words a tradeoff between the
payload length and the number of samples required to reliably
detect encrypted content.
Random uniform data was measured in a similar way as the
previous experiment. The plaintext data was extracted using
randomly selected contiguous quotes from the Brown corpus
[16], with varying data length in bits along the x-axis.
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Figure V.3: Difference and 95% confidence band between σ∞
for plaintext and random data using Min-entropy for varying
input data length in bits.
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Figure V.4: Difference and 95% confidence band between
σα for plaintext and random data using normalised Shannon
entropy for varying input data length in bits.
Figure V.2 shows the difference between σα for plaintext
and random data using bit- and octet-entropy respectively for
varying input data lengths in bits. Shannon bit-entropy is the
metric that distinguishes best between cleartext and encrypted
data for data lengths greater than 400 bits (50 bytes).
Figure V.4 shows that Shannon octet entropy is able to
distinguish reliably between cleartext and encrypted data over
a sample of 50 IDS alarms within a 95% confidence interval
from 5 octets (40 bits) and onwards, despite the poor conver-
gence properties for random traffic in the range [5, 131] octets.
However, due to the slightly hourglassed shape of the
entropy difference, it is not possible to achieve any larger
precision between 40 and 3000 bits (375 bytes), unless the
sample size is increased to narrow the confidence band suffi-
ciently. Plaintext data is 11 times larger than encrypted data
14
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Figure V.5: Payload length corrected Shannon bit-entropy with
95% confidence band as a function of input data length in bits
for plaintext and random data.
at 5 octets (40 bits), whereas at around 128 octets (1024 bits),
is down to 1.8 times larger than the encrypted data, before
the random data reaches its knee point where the octet-based
metric again improves.
Shannon bit-entropy is more well-behaved than Shannon
octet entropy, in that the difference in entropy seems to
be a strictly convex function, as opposed to the octet-based
entropies. Min-bit-entropy also seems to be well behaved, and
has the advantage that the 95% confidence band for Min-bit-
entropy is narrower than for Shannon bit-entropy. However it is
still overall a much poorer measure of entropy difference than
Shannon bit-entropy, since it requires at least 6000 bits (750
octets) to reliably distinguish between plaintext and encrypted
data. Octet-based Min-entropy, , as shown in Figure V.3,
behaves extremely poorly, and is not usable for distinguishing
between plaintext and encrypted text.
Overall, this strengthens the conclusion that Shannon en-
tropy is the best metric, regardless of symbol definition since it
converges faster than the other alternatives and it distinguishes
better between cleartext and encrypted data as long as the
payload is longer than the minimum threshold of 5 octets for
octet-based entropy or 50 octets for bit-entropy for minimum
50 samples.
D. Payload Length Correction for Bit-entropy
A deficiency with the entropy standard deviation metrics,
is that they decrease as the data length increases. This is the
desired behaviour for random uniform data, however it is not
necessarily desirable for plaintext data, since this means that
the metric can not be considered incentive compatible: it will
then pay off for an adversary to match as large plaintext data
packets as possible, since this in effect reduces the measured
information leakage. An obvious way to mitigate this problem
might be to multiply the entropy values with the length
ni = |yi| of the IDS alarm, i.e. niHα(yi), and then take the
standard deviation of the length corrected entropy values. This
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Figure V.6: Payload length corrected Shannon octet-entropy
with 95% confidence band as a function of input data length
in bits for plaintext and random data.
correction will however be too strong, since the expected bias
for random uniform data of length ni then would be constant:
σbias1 ≈ γ1nini = γ1. This means that the metric would not
converge to zero for encrypted traffic.
This problem can be mitigated by multiplying the entropy
values with the square root of the payload length ni. This
means that the length corrected entropy values for bit-entropy
can be described as H
′
α(yi) =
√
niHα(yi).
The length-corrected privacy leakage metric piLR, can be
expressed as:
piLR = I · σLk = I ·
√
2
N∑
i=1
wi,k
∣∣∣H ′1(yi)− µ˜′k∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
wi,k
. (V.1)
where µ˜
′
k is the median from the LMM.
The payload length corrected Shannon bit-entropy standard
deviation function is shown in Figure V.5. It can be observed
that the term
√
niHα(yi) essentially reduces the convergence
speed to detect random uniform traffic for Shannon entropy
by a factor of O(n−
1
2 ) to σbias1 ≈ γ1√n , similar to Min-entropy
originally. However random uniform traffic will still converge
towards 0, as required, although somewhat more slowly. Fur-
thermore, the measured privacy leakage for plaintext data will
now increase exponentially as a function of payload length,
instead of decreasing, as long as the payload length is larger
than the required 100 bytes (800 bits). These modifications
avoids the incentive incompatibility for Shannon bit-entropy,
since the metric now increases with increasing payload length.
E. Payload Length Correction for Shannon Octet-based En-
tropy
Shannon octet-based entropy has the same convergence
speed as Min-entropy after an initial transient phase, as shown
15
in Figure V.1. This means that
√
ni can be used as a length
correction factor also for Shannon octet-entropy for large
entropy values (¿200 octets or 1600 bits), to ensure that the
measured privacy leakage increases with the payload length
for plaintext data, and decreases with the payload length for
random data.
This length correction does however not work well below
200 octets, since Shannon octet entropy initially rises quicly
until a knee point at 50 bits for plaintext data and 150 bits for
random data, and then starts falling, as shown in Figure V.4.
It is desirable to reduce the effect of this knee point, in order
to have an easier functional relationship between plaintext
and random data, so that a fixed threshold can be used to
distinguish between cleartext and random traffic. Introducing
an additional length correction factor of 1log2(ni) where ni is
the length of the payload yi can be used to reduce the effect
of this knee point, as shown in Figure V.6. This means that
the payload length correction function for Shannon octet-based
entropy is H
′
α(yi) =
√
ni
log2(ni)
.
Payload length corrected Shannon octet-entropy standard
deviation as a function of payload length is shown in Figure
V.6. The initial slightly hour-glassed shape of the standard
deviation functions means that the octet-based function despite
the payload correction still is reduced slightly for plaintext data
between 48 and 800 bits (5 and 100 bytes) payload length. This
means that the metric is not entirely incentive compatible in
this range, since it is slightly decreasing for plaintext istead of
increasing, however the deviation is not very large. The octet-
based metric is however incentive compatible beyond 100
bytes, since the metric then increases with increasing payload
length for plaintext data. An advantage with Shannon octet-
entropy, is that it is able to detect whether short strings of data
is encrypted or cleartext, for example from pseudonymisation
schemes, assuming that the data is at least 5 octets and
encrypted using a perfect encryption scheme.
Another advantage with the payload length corrected en-
tropy metrics, is that a fixed threshold can be used to dis-
tinguish between plaintext and random data, regardless of
payload length for a sufficiently large sample (minimum 50
samples). For Shannon bit-entropy this threshold is 0.028,
whereas Shannon octet-entropy has a threshold of 0.14 (five
times larger).
It must be noted that it is possible to construct data that
falls between the two example entropies used here. The first
example that comes to mind, is partially encrypted IDS alarms,
where for example a header part is nonencrypted and a
payload part is encrypted or coded (e.g. compressed). In these
cases, some IDS alarms would be interpreted as encrypted,
whereas others may be interpreted as nonencrypted. However,
an advantage with the octet-based metric, is that relatively
few octets are required to calculate it, which means that the
header and remaining payload in such cases can be calculated
separately.
F. Standard Deviation of Entropy for Base64-encoded Data
Another interesting case is how σα copes with quoting
techniques used to transfer binary data on transport protocols
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Figure V.7: Payload length corrected Shannon octet-entropy
with 95% confidence band as a function of input data length
in bits for plaintext and Base64-encoded random data.
that are not 8-bit clean. A common encoding technique is
Base64-encoding, which can be used to transfer binary in-
formation in SMTP and XML-based formats like HTML or
SOAP. Figure V.7 shows the standard deviation of Shannon
octet-entropy for plaintext and Base64 encoded random data.
The Base64-encoding adds redundancy, which means that the
encoded data is closer to plaintext data. This can be seen from
the Figure, since the confidence bands now overlap for less
than 800 bit (100 bytes). However, for longer input data, the
Base64-encoded random data behaves in a similar way like
plain random data, since the standard deviation goes towards
0.
This means that at least 100 bytes are required to reli-
ably distinguish between Base64-encoded random data and
plaintext data. If it is known that the information is Base64-
encoded, then it will be possible to decode the information
before the entropy is calculated. This may be useful if the in-
formation leakage of shorter Base64-encoded strings are being
measured. However this decoding will add additional parsing
overhead, which may not be desirable from a performance
perspective. This is however avoidable, as long as the payload
is larger than 100 bytes as shown above.
G. Semantic Information of Symbols
The symbol definition for the entropy algorithms will also
need to take into account the semantic information that sym-
bols convey. The definition of bytes (or more precisely octets)
is in particular important for computer systems, since this is
used to define the basic character set used for communicating
both text and binary codes. Octet-based symbol definition is
also important for many of the attack vectors discussed in the
introduction. Buffer overflow attacks for example frequently
use the single octet NOP instruction (0x90 on Intel machines)
for the NOP sled. There also exist multi-octet NOP variants
and other techniques for generating an obfuscated sled [1].
However for now consider single byte based NOP sleds, which
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are common, not the least because they are easier to exploit.
Using this strategy means that the shellcode does not need
to be placed on an exact 32- or 64 bits word boundary, as
compilers typically enforce for normal programs [1].
The single-byte NOP sled (0x90) is a unique symbol for
octet-based entropy, however for bit entropy, this represents
the binary string 10010000, which has two out of eight bit
set. The problem is that this value is not unique. There will
in general be 8!/((8 − 2)! · 2!) = 28 different octets, where
any combination of these can produce the same two-bit based
entropy value as this NOP opcode. In fact, bit-entropy means
that 256 different octet values are mapped down to only 9
different bit-entropies. Furthermore, whereas the octet entropy
of a list of NOP opcodes will be zero, the bit-entropy will
be greater than zero, except if all bits are ’1’ or ’0’. The
Shannon bit-entropy of the NOP sled is 0.81, which is very
different from the octet-entropy (0). Furthermore, if one octet
of information is changed, this means that somewhere between
one and eight bits will change. There is in other words a
less clear correlation between the change in information and
change in entropy for bit-entropy than for octet-based entropy.
This means that octet-based entropy is closer to representing
the meaning of the information being exchanged, and therefore
should be the preferred symbol definition for the privacy
metrics. The discussion above has also identified that the
standard deviation of Shannon octet-entropy is the metric
that overall has the best properties for distinguishing between
cleartext and encrypted data, despite its poor convergence
properties over part of the usable range. Octet-based entropy
is furthermore able to uniquely identify that a sequence of the
same octet has zero entropy, something bit-entropy does not
identify. This means that Shannon octet-entropy will provide
the largest possible difference in entropy between plaintext and
strings consisting of sequences of the same character. Shannon
octet-entropy is in other words a better privacy leakage metric
than Shannon bit-entropy with better distinguishing capability
according to our requirements and needs within the operating
range. Min-entropy is not usable for our purpose.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The experimental results are based on IDS alarms from my
own home network between 2009 and 2011. Some of the IDS
alarms are also from the KDD-Cup’99 data set. We included
the 32 most noisy IDS rules with at least 50 IDS alarms per
cluster in the measurements. The threshold of 50 IDS alarms
per cluster is chosen to stay within the 95% confidence bands
discussed in the simulations in Section V-C. This is a limited
data set that will not reflect the privacy leakage measured at
a professional MSS provider doing large-scale measurements.
The main difference that can be expected from a larger MSS
provider, is that there would be a greater selection of IDS
alarms with more than 50 alarms per cluster, and that the
number of attack clusters would be greater. Furthermore, a
larger set of IDS alarms may be enabled by commercial MSS
providers to counter for emerging threats that are not yet in
the Snort VRT ruleset, which we used. Furthermore, traffic
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Figure VI.1: Number of attack vectors estimated per IDS rule
for Shannon octet-entropy.
from a commercial MSS provider would not be influenced by
the synthetic KDD-Cup’99 data set.
However, despite these deficiencies, there are also some
advantages by using our own data. One of the main ad-
vantages, is that this allows for discussing the IDS rules
that may be leaking private or confidential information in
detail, something that it according to our experience would be
difficult or impossible to do for a commercial MSS provider
due to business confidentiality and repudiation concerns. We
have attempted to get agreement for such measurements for
commercial MSS providers, however this is only possible if the
IDS ruleset is not revealed, which makes it difficult to discuss
in a convincing way that the proposed privacy leakage metrics
work as intended. More elaborate tests at a commercial MSS
provider is therefore left as future work. We decided to use
a privacy impact factor I = 1 to only show the information
leakage part of the privacy leakage metrics.
The experiment includes an IDS rule that we created
(sid:1:1394000) which tests the worst-case scenario from a
privacy perspective. This is a threshold-based IDS rule that
essentially samples every 10th packet from the network. This
is intended to show the maximum value that the privacy metric
typically is able to detect, which is useful to see how far
away the IDS rules in the measurements are from a worst-
case scenario.
A. Number of Attack Vectors
The number of attack vectors per IDS rule for the given
experiment is summarised in Figure VI.1. For this experiment,
53% (17 rules) have one attack vector, 31% (10 rules) have two
clusters identifying attack vectors, 13% (4 rules) have three
clusters and 3% (1 rule) have 4 clusters identifying attack
vectors. Please note that these numbers are specific to the
given experiment. A preliminary experiment at a commercial
MSS provider indicates that large-scale operations can expect
the distribution to be shifted somewhat towards more attack
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vectors. It is in other words common that IDS rules may trigger
on more than one attack vector, which means that clustering
must be used to calculate the entropy of each underlying attack
vector.
VII. INFLUENCE BY OUTLIERS
Figure VII.1 shows the Normal standard deviation σ1 and
Laplacian standard deviation σL1 based on the L
1 norm for
length corrected normalised Shannon octet-entropy. The Fig-
ure shows that the Normal standard deviation σ1 for some
IDS rules indicate a significantly larger privacy leakage than
the Laplacian standard deviation σL1 . The most extreme cases
are SID 119:14 which detects non-standard characters in web
requests and SID 1:399 ICMP Host unreachable. The reason
for the deviation is in both these cases outliers far out from
the main cluster. The Normal standard deviation will give too
high weight to the outliers in these cases, since it measures
the root of the squared distances. Other IDS rules where the
Normal standard deviation of entropy is somewhat influenced
by outliers are amongst others SIDs 119:4, 119:15 and 1:1201.
In all these cases, the Laplacian standard deviation will
give a more realistic estimate of the privacy leakage than the
Normal standard deviation. The Laplacian standard deviation
is only significantly larger than the Normal standard deviation
for SID 1:402 ICMP Destination Port unreachable. This IDS
rule has a left skewed noisy distribution, with several peaks
reflecting the servers that were attempted contacted, but did
not respond. We interpreted this as one cluster, since the failed
services strictly speaking cannot be considered attack vectors.
The median for this IDS rule (at 7.5) deviates somewhat
from the mean (at 7.2), which gives more weight to the
leftmost peaks for the Laplacian standard deviation than the
Normal standard deviation does in this case, causing the
Laplacian standard deviation to be larger than the Normal
standard deviation. This is a pathological case where the
normal standard deviation may give a better estimate than the
Laplacian standard deviation. However, overall the Laplacian
standard deviation σL1 should be used to calculate the privacy
leakage metric, since this in most cases is the more robust
statistic.
A. Measured Information Leakage
Figure VII.1 shows the measured privacy leakage for the
experiment using length corrected standard deviation (Normal
σ1 and Laplacian σL1 ) of normalised Shannon octet-entropy as
a function of Snort IDS rule. Further details can be found in
Table I. This discussion is based on the Laplacian standard
deviation, since the previous section shows that the Normal
standard deviation has problems with outliers in the dataset.
First, it can be observed that the metric works as expected
for the extreme cases. The IDS rule that performs random
sampling of payload (SID 1:1394000) has the highest privacy
leakage. On the other hand, there also exist 5 IDS rules that are
very precise at matching the attack vector, and behaves like
the perfect model IDS rule RP with zero privacy leakage.
IDS rules that fall into this category are attack vectors like
SID 1:2050 SQL Version Overflow attempt, SID 1:2003 SQL
Worm Propagation attempt, SID 105:2 BO traffic and SID
106:4 spp rpc decode preprocessor which detect amongst
others incomplete RPC segments. All these IDS rules indicate
possibly malicious activities, and are precise at detecting the
attack. SID 1:382 which detects ICMP Echo requests (Ping)
for Windows also behaves like a perfect IDS rule. It typically
sends the alphabet in the payload.
There are furthermore 9 additional IDS rules with privacy
leakage lower than the threshold of 0.14 for distinguishing
between plaintext and encrypted traffic that was identified in
Section V-D. Rules in this category can be considered to have
insignificant privacy leakage, since it is not distinguishable
from encrypted traffic. These include ICMP rules matching
ICMP Echo Request and Reply for various platforms (SIDs
1:384, 1:408 and 1:368) and ICMP traceroute (SID 1:385).
These ICMP protocols are part of the TCP/IP protocol suite
and are benign in themselves, however the Ping protocol is
also frequently used for malicious activities like Denial of
Service attacks or Ping scans. Furthermore pre-attack activities
like portscanning (SIDs 122:1 and 122:3), and unauthorised
inbound SIP calls (SID 1:11969) are potentially malicious
activities that fall into this category. Last, SID 1:1437 detects
download of Windows media files. This would normally be
considered a benign activity, and it may also be concerning
from a privacy perspective if this IDS rule is activated, since
it could be used to monitor user activities. This rule detects
download of Windows media files as two narrow clusters,
where the upper cluster at an entropy close to 1 probably
indicates download of the compressed media file. This is an
example of a pathological case where the entropy standard
deviation in itself, as an indirect measure of privacy leakage,
does not match the perceived privacy leakage. The data
controller may in this case consider whether the privacy impact
I of this IDS rule should be increased.
The privacy leaking IDS rules can broadly be subdivided
into two groups: IDS rules with large privacy leakage (σL1 > 1)
and IDS rules with medium privacy leakage (σL1 ∈< 0.14, 1]).
There are 13 IDS rules with medium privacy leakage. The
most privacy leaking of these IDS rules, is SID 1:1394
“SHELLCODE x86 inc ecx NOP” which triggers on any
packet that contains a sequence of 31 ’A’ characters (σL1 =
0.97). The problem is that this sometimes occurs in hex-
encoded URLs or hex-encoded data in web pages. It may
also occur in non-compressed images, as well as for other
protocols. This means that the rule most likely will trigger on
a lot of random traffic, which is problematic from a privacy
perspective.
Many of the rules with medium privacy leakage may be
triggered by normal user behaviour, for example SID 1:486
ICMP Destination Unreachable, SID 1:402 ICMP Destination
Port Unreachable and SID 1:399 ICMP Host unreachable.
These can be problematic from a privacy perspective, since
the ICMP error message often contains the payload of the
original request, and these error messages can for example
be triggered by high traffic volume (or DoS attacks) towards
a server. This means that these ICMP messages essentially
sample random user traffic. There are also other IDS rules
in this category that will sample random traffic from users,
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Figure VII.1: Privacy leakage measured using length corrected standard deviation (Normal σ1 and Laplacian σL1 ) of normalised
Shannon octet-entropy as a function of Snort IDS rule.
Snort SID Alarms Clusters σ1 σL1 Description
1:1394000 95096 1 6,71 6,70 Samples random traffic
119:14 3104 1 4,10 3,49 http inspect non-standard characters in web request
1:402 36224 1 2,34 2,73 ICMP Destination Port unreachable
1:1201 680 1 1,96 1,77 HTTP 403 Forbidden
119:15 720 1 1,40 1,02 http inspect over-long URL
1:1394 1384 2 0,90 0,97 Shellcode x86 NOP AAAAAA
119:4 576 1 1,24 0,91 http inspect preprocessor (IIS decoding attacks)
1:1852 10392 1 0,96 0,75 robots.txt access
1:1463 288 1 0,80 0,72 IRC Chat
119:2 21744 2 0,58 0,61 http inspect double encoded characters
1:399 631840 1 1,02 0,58 ICMP Host unreachable
119:7 1520 2 0,48 0,43 http inspect unicode encoded web request
1:12592 312 1 0,33 0,40 SMTP command injection attempt
1:2925 12960 2 0,42 0,35 1x1 GIF attempt (web bug)
1:1560 360 2 0,27 0,30 WEB-MISC /doc access
1:486 368 1 0,37 0,27 ICMP Destination Unreachable
128:4 306616 3 0,25 0,27 spp ssh
119:18 22760 2 0,32 0,18 http inspect directory traversal outside web server root.
122:1 576 2 0,08 0,10 sfPortscan preprocessor (tcp portsweep)
122:3 2088 1 0,09 0,09 sfPortscan preprocessor (tcp portsweep)
1:384 566016 4 0,04 0,08 ICMP Ping (general)
1:1437 1056 2 0,08 0,08 MULTIMEDIA Windows Media download
1:408 205904 3 0,04 0,04 ICMP Echo Reply
1:366 202552 1 0,04 0,04 ICMP Ping *NIX
1:368 202552 1 0,04 0,04 ICMP Ping BSD
1:11969 2896 3 0,03 0,03 VOIP-SIP inbound 401 Unauthorized
1:385 4392 2 0,04 0,03 ICMP traceroute
1:382 2192 1 0,00 0,00 ICMP Ping Windows (alphabet)
1:2050 32024 1 0,00 0,00 SQL Version Overflow attempt.
1:2003 1777264 1 0,00 0,00 SQL Worm Propagation attempt.
105:2 192 2 0,00 0,00 BO traffic (spp bo)
106:4 464 3 0,00 0,00 spp rpc decode preprocessor - e.g. incomplete RPC
segment.
Table I: Privacy leakage measured using length corrected standard deviation based on Shannon octet-entropy for the IDS rules
in the experiment.
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which for example may be used in user profiling. Examples
of such rules are SID 1:2925 1x1 GIF attempt that detects
web bugs, SID 1:1560 that triggers on access to /doc on the
web server root and SIDs 119:2, 119:4, and 119:7 that aim
at detecting anomalies in HTTP requests like double encoded
requests, IIS decoding attacks and unicode encoded requests.
These may indicate attacks, but will in most cases probably
be false alarms that essentially sample random user traffic,
something that may be problematic from a privacy perspective.
1:1852 robots.txt access, which normally indicates indexing of
a web server by a web crawler, also falls into this category.
There are also some other attack rules with medium privacy
leakage that do not target ICMP or web traffic. SID 128:4
detects non-SSH traffic on an SSH port, or a protocol mis-
match (e.g. SSH1 traffic on an SSH2 port). This rule triggers
on the initial key negotiation phase, where some information
in the SSH protocol goes in cleartext. This can probably not
be considered a significant primary source of privacy leakage,
since no sensitive information is transferred in the packets. The
data controller may consider reducing the privacy impact for
this IDS rule. SID 1:12592 detects SMTP command injection
attempts, that aims at exploiting a bug in the ClamAV anti-
virus system. The rule definition is a very simple regular
expression which is likely to have false alarms. This rule may
therefore be concerning from a privacy perspective, although
it mostly triggered on spam. Rule 1:1463 triggers on IRC
chat traffic, which also may be concerning from a privacy
perspective. The reason for implementing this rule, is that
IRC bots also often have been used to control botnets of
compromised hosts. However, the rule does not check whether
the traffic is benign or not.
There are four IDS rules with high privacy leakage, not
including the test rule that samples random traffic. Three of
these trigger on web traffic: SIDs 119:14, 119:15 and 1:1201.
The most privacy leaking ordinary IDS rule (SID 119:14,
σL1 = 3.49) triggers on non-standard character encodings
in HTTP requests, which are getting increasingly common,
especially after IANA allowed non-ASCII domain names. The
second most privacy leaking IDS rule is SID 1:402 ICMP
Destination Port Unreachable with σL1 = 2.73. This protocol
typically copies the failed request in the ICMP message, and
therefore samples random traffic requests. On third place is
SID 1:1201 HTTP 403 Forbidden (σL1 = 1.77), which also
is quite common also for benign traffic, for example on web
sites referring to internal material that require subscription.
On fourth place is SID 119:15 that tests for over-long URL’s
(σL1 = 1.02), something that frequently happens for blogs
or search engines that use URL referencing. All of these
rules may be problematic from a privacy perspective, since
they in many cases will trigger on normal user behaviour.
It is especially problematic if the IDS rules monitoring web
services are set up in an uncritical way, so that these rules
trigger for any web server accesses and not only for relevant
web servers (e.g. the company’s own web servers).
This discussion shows that the privacy leakage metric is
able to distinguish between IDS rules that most likely may
trigger on ordinary user activities, and therefore may be
problematic from a privacy perspective, from the IDS rules
that are precise at detecting the underlying attack vector,
or that perform a very specific task without leaking any
significant amount of data about user behaviour. However
there were also two pathological cases where it may make
sense to adjust the privacy impact, since using entropy as an
indirect measure of privacy leakage not always will gives a
true picture of whether the underlying information is sensitive
from a privacy/confidentiality perspective or not. Overall,
this demonstrates that the privacy leakage metric works as
intended. However larger studies involving commercial MSS
providers will be needed in the future to confirm these results.
B. The Effect of Anonymisation
The resulting privacy leakage over all IDS alarms in the
experiment, weighted according to number of alarms, is 0.31.
However, if the test IDS rule with SID 1:1394000 that samples
random data is removed, then the resulting privacy leakage is
reduced to 0.16. If all the IDS rules with high privacy leakage
are removed, then the resulting leakage is reduced by 0.02 to
0.14.
Surprisingly, it is then more efficient to anonymise all ICMP
Destination Host unreachable alarms, since there are many of
them (631840) in the data set, and each of them has a sig-
nificant measured privacy leakage (σL1 = 0.58). Anonymising
ICMP Destination Host unreachable alarms would reduce the
overall privacy leakage by 0.07 to 0.07. This can probably be
done without reducing the usability for the security analyst
significantly, since it still would be known which host that
was attempted contacted from the IP-address element of the
IDS alarm. SID 1:402 ICMP Destination Port unreachable also
triggers quite often (32360 times) and has the second highest
measured privacy leakage (σL1 = 2.73). Anonymising this rule
reduces the privacy leakage by 0.02 to 0.05, and can probably
also be done without reducing the possibility to do root cause
analysis significantly, since the number of services running on
a server normally is limited. Classification based on the EM-
clustering can if necessary be used to indicate which server
that failed without revealing the original user request. These
examples show that the total privacy leakage, calculated as
the product of number of IDS alarms NR for the given rule R
and the entropy standard deviation σL1,R, must be used as the
optimisation criterion to reduce the overall privacy leakage.
The total privacy leakage is calculated as Ltot = NRσL1,R.
Another IDS rule, that either benefits from anonymisation,
alternatively by setting the privacy impact to zero, is SID
128:4 which detects ssh anomalies. This rule triggers quite
often (306616 times) with σL1 = 0.27, which means that the
overall privacy leakage can be reduced by 0.02 to 0.03 if
this rule is anonymised. If the IDS rules with low privacy
leakage, that are not relevant from a privacy perspective (all
with privacy leakage less than 0.14, except SID 1:1437), are
either anonymised or removed by setting the privacy impact to
zero, then the resulting privacy leakage index is reduced from
0.03 to 0.011.
If the two IDS rules from the http inspect preprocessor
with largest total leakage (SID 119:14 and 119:2) also are
anonymised, then the measured privacy leakage is reduced to
0.005.
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This illustrates how a structured method can be used to
reduce the privacy leakage of the IDS ruleset based on
measured privacy leakage and number of IDS alarms. It is
furthermore also clear that many of the IDS rules can be
anonymised without significantly reducing the usability for the
security analysts. Especially since the clustering model used
to identify attack vectors in many cases can be used to help
the security analysts in identifying the necessary properties of
the underlying data without having to reveal the user payload.
VIII. RELATED WORKS
The research area of quantitative information flow based on
information theory adds a comprehensive theoretical frame-
work for analysing privacy leakage based on entropies [34,
33]. Our research is based on this, and extends the theory to
cover privacy leakage in IDS alarms. There is as far as we
are aware of no other research that proposes a comprehensive
model of privacy leakage in IDS alarms based on quantitative
information flow analysis.
Quantitative information flow analysis that in a similar way
uses information entropy has however been proposed used to
derive an intrusion detection capability metric in [20]. This
metric aims at modelling the uncertainty about the input given
the IDS output. The uncertainty as it is termed in this paper
is the same as the information leakage defined here based
on [34], which in turn is based on the notion of mutual
information from [32]. The IDS capability metric is defined
as the mutual information between the IDS input and output
to the entropy of the input:
CID =
H(X)−H(X|Y )
H(X)
(VIII.1)
The numerator is the same as the information leakage
defined in [34], however these data are normalised with respect
to the entropy of the input data, something our model does
not do. This model assumes that the input data H(X) is
the labels (attack or not) from a labeled IDS test set, and
the output data H(X|Y ) is the classification by the IDS,
which also is different from our conceptual model of an
IDS rule. It is from this clear that the proposed metric is
different from the privacy leakage metric proposed here, since
it assumes different input data, a different information model
and normalises the indicator to the input data. However an
interesting similarity is that the effect of false positives in
Figure 3b) in this paper follows a similar falling exponential
curve as Figure VII.1, as can be expected, since the false
alarms here will increase the entropy up to the point where
the classifier is not better than random decisions. However this
paper does not make the connection to privacy leakage metrics
for IDS rules.
There are also some similarities between the proposed
approach and the concept of Differential Privacy in statis-
tical databases [10, 11, 12]. Both methods use a Maximum
Likelihood (ML) estimate, however the estimate is interpreted
differently. Differential Privacy uses the ML estimate to indi-
cate the aggregate value of underlying perturbed data, whereas
we use the ML estimate as a measure of underlying attack
vectors. Both methods use robust statistics (first norm) for
calculating aggregated values. However, Differential Privacy
typically adds Laplacian noise to hide individual elements
of privacy sensitive information, whereas our privacy leakage
metric works in the opposite way - assumed Laplacian noise
from an IDS rule is used as an indication of IDS privacy
leakage. So although there are similarities, our proposed metric
is clearly different to Differential Privacy.
Entropy has previously been proposed as a measure of
privacy [5, 3]. Claude Shannon’s seminal paper on information
theory was the first publication where entropy was proposed to
measure the level of ambiguity or equivocation in transferred
information [32]. Min-entropy has been proposed as a metric
of anonymity that in particular considers local aspects, i.e. the
worst case scenario for the user [38]. The more general Rnyi
entropy has been proposed as a metric of anonymity in [31, 3].
Neither of these have used entropy to measure privacy leakage
in IDS alarms.
The paper is also related to field of privacy-preserving
intrusion detection systems [36, 14, 35, 29, 26, 15], however
neither of these solutions focus on privacy metrics.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we propose an entropy-based privacy leakage
metric founded on quantitative information flow analysis. An
advantage is that this metric can be calculated based on already
existing information in the IDS alarm database. From a privacy
perspective, it provides a structured approach to identify which
IDS rules that may be leaking sensitive information and also
for handling such privacy leakages.
An advantage with the metric, is that it also is a measure
of IDS rule precision. This is clearly desirable, since the
objective is to tune the IDS ruleset to reduce the leakage
of private or confidential information over time, for example
through improving the precision of the IDS rule or by applying
anonymisation techniques. This is also an advantage from a
security perspective, since more precise IDS rules mean less
effort spent on false alarm handling.
We have demonstrated that the proposed approach is feasi-
ble based on a set of real IDS alarms. It is furthermore shown
that different entropy algorithms and ways to calculate the
standard deviation have different strengths and weaknesses.
Not surprisingly, the Laplacian standard deviation based on
the L1 norm provides the most robust statistic to avoid
problems with outliers, a problem that has been shown to occur
in the experimental data. The experiments have shown that
Shannon octet-entropy is the best entropy metric with fastest
convergence speed for reliably detecting encrypted traffic, and
it is also the entropy metric that is is best at distinguishing
between plaintext and encrypted traffic. It is also shown how
the metric can avoid being incentive incompatible by taking
into account the length of the input data.
The Laplacian Mixture Model of the underlying data will
in itself be useful for classification purposes. If a given
model of the data has been identified, then this can be used
for subsequent classification of the underlying samples, for
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example to anonymise IDS alarms from data clusters that
may contain sensitive information about user transactions, or
to further classify the attack vectors of the IDS alarms, for
example to detect Denial of Service attacks. The clustering can
therefore be used as a post-processing step to modify the IDS
alarms according to cluster, which means acting as a higher
order IDS solution.
A possible attack on the clustering method, is an overfitting
attack where a MSS provider decides to shirk by deliberately
overfitting the attack vectors. The proposed method to avoid
this, is to ensure separation of duties between privacy and
security interests and also that third party certification organ-
isations oversee the operation.
The proposed privacy leakage metric only measures the
primary privacy leakage sources in IDS alarms. It does not
consider secondary sources of information leakage, like cor-
relation of different information sources. However, being able
to measure the primary sources of privacy leakage in IDS
alarms is at least an initial approach that can and should be
considered before more elaborate analyses of the anonymity
set are performed. Furthermore, the ability to verify that the
anonymisation policies reduce measured information leakages
means that policy verification, in the form of a privacy leakage
gap analysis, will be possible in order to provide incremental
reductions of privacy leakage in IDS alarms over time.
X. FUTURE WORK
Future work includes doing comparative studies of the per-
formance of different MSS providers from a privacy perspec-
tive. Adapting the privacy leakage metric to support anomaly-
based IDS is also left as future work. This will amongst others
require subdivision of the alarms, for example based on service
etc., to avoid that the entropy space becomes too crowded by
attack vectors.
Investigating possible secondary privacy leakages that may
occur due to inference or cross correlation between different
information sources both within the IDS alarm and outside
is also left as future research. This would require taking
the privacy leakage metrics and evaluation even further in
order to evaluate the anonymity set that can be expected for
private or sensitive information, using metrics like differential
privacy [10, 11, 12], k-anonymity [9], or l-diversity [24].
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